

Implications of Vote Buying for Democracy in Nigeria

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Abstract

The researchers examined vote buying and its implications in Nigerian democracy. This paper employed quantitative method. Data were sourced from eligible register voters in Ogwa, Esan West Local Government Area of Edo State using questionnaire. Data were analysed with simple percentage and Liner regression using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The finding revealed that there is a significant relationship between vote buying and electoral violence in Nigeria. Findings further showed that vote buying and dividends of democracy are significantly related in Nigerian democracy. It equally indicated that vote buying has a significant relationship with partisan loyalty in Nigeria. Thus, it was recommended among others that Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) should carry out a crushing enlightenment campaign across the nook and cranny of the country to educate the voters and politicians about the evils and ills of vote selling and buying on Nigerian democracy.

Keywords: Vote, Buying, Election, Democracy, Nigeria

Introduction

Democracy has been adjudged as the best form of government in liberal political societies in the world. This is because it constitutionally guarantees individual rights, especially rights to political association and participation which promotes sense of patriotism to the people by allowing them to make choice of leaders during elections (Osumah, 2019). Election is one of the core characteristics of democracy; it provides the opportunity for the

qualified citizens to vote and be voted for into the seats of power and authority to manage state affairs and resources. Voting is a political right constitutionally granted to adult citizens in any democratic political community. It is an instrument used to induce changes or bring alternative government. Thus, election is the backbone of democracy; it forms the major pillar that supports and stabilised every democratic institution. No wonder, Baidoo, Dankwa & Eshun (2018) said that election forms an important pillar that places the power to govern with the people. Chyi-Lu & Chun-Ping (2016, p.18) opined that elections are important to a nation's construction and the electorates, since they perform the role of a litmus test for democratic institutions. Elections ensure that democratic pillars including rule of law, ballot secrecy, separation of powers, independence of the judiciary and many more are strengthened. This, to a large extent ensures that abuse of offices is minimised by those who are given tenured mandate to pilot the affairs of the state.

According to Akwetey (2016, p.4), "elections and voting are important mechanisms for selecting leaders into political offices in every democracy." He argued that Elections aggregate preferences, help select better public officials, and provide incentives for politicians to act in the interest of the voters they represent since it is through elections that candidates are able to appeal and explain their intended policies to electorate before they are voted into power. The idea behind voting revolves around the need to either change a regime leadership or seek endorsement from the electorate to enhance democratic and constitutional transitions in a country. In either ways, it is a requirement of a democratic system which gives the electorate right to decision making by electing candidates of their choice to represent them in various political positions in the state (Arnold, 2019).

Periodic election is one of the processes by which real democracy is practised in the liberal societies in the world. Elections are guided by rules and regulations to ensure effective representation. Unfortunately, in many democratic societies today, electoral laws are in fact, completely violated because of over-ambition for power and wealth. The inordinate desire of politicians to occupy leadership positions in the state for selfish interest has made election and voting in many political communities in the world a do or die affair. Consequently, elections in many countries have been ruined with serious cases of vote buying, snatching of ballot boxes, election violence, etc. (Afolabi, 2007; Akwetey, 2016; Babatunde, Shaibu & Ariyo, 2019). In Nigeria, the occurrence of these democratic insubordinations, especially vote buying is becoming so alarming and the price is undermining of the benefits of democracy among people. Of course, the interest of the electorate may not be represented in a political community where vote buying exists. Against this background, this paper sought to investigate vote buying and its implications on democracy in Nigeria.

Statement of the Problem

Elections in all societies face some level of challenges. Among the challenges that beset elections in a democratic system is the issue of vote buying. Vote buying in some literature has been referred to as clientelism. Baidoo, Dankwa & Eshun (2018, p.2) noted that "the use of electoral incentives to buy votes have been a frequent practice during electoral

campaigns and elections in several developing and developed countries and have continued along the path towards democracy.” The Nigerian democracy among other issues faces the challenges of electoral violence, ballot boxes snatching, fake elections result publications and corruption of electoral umpires among others. As the democracy matures, the issue of vote buying has become alarming. The political actors have become more desperate to get into power and loot public funds unchecked. Majority of eligible voters are coerced by political parties’ agents during or before the election day into offering their votes or permanent voter cards (PVCs) identity card to a political party on the basis of instant financial or material gratifications. Vote buying in Nigeria present so many challenges. The continued barbaric brazen practice of vote buying among political parties in Nigeria has handicapped democratic dividends, endorsed lack of accountability and transparency. This in turn gave raise to violence and conflicts during elections and partisan loyalty jettisoning the country’s development. Thus, it has become germane and pertinent to examine the continued unabated consequences of vote buying and its implications on Nigeria’s democracy.

Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study were to:

1. Evaluate the effects of vote buying on political violence in Nigerian democracy.
2. Ascertain the effects of vote buying on dividends of democracy in Nigeria.
3. Examine whether vote buying leads to partisan loyalty in Nigerian democracy.

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses stated in a null form were tested in this study:

- H₀₁: There is no significant relationship between vote buying and political violence in Nigerian democracy
- H₀₂: There is no significant relationship between vote buying and dividends of democracy in Nigerian.
- H₀₃: There is no significant relationship between vote buying and partisan loyalty in Nigerian democracy.

Conceptualisation of Democracy

The concept is as old as the practice. In the academic realm, every scholar seems to have a definition which appeals to the context of their research. Democracy may be a word familiar to most, but it is a concept still misunderstood and misused at a time when dictators, single-party regimes and military coup leaders alike assert popular support by claiming the mantle of democracy (Gizzi, Sovell & Wilkerson, 2008). Nwogu (2015) opined that it is difficult to reach a consensus on the definition of democracy. However, the main idea of democracy is widely accepted to have originated from Athens in the 5th century BC. In his perspective, Jarvie (2006) defined democracy in contrast to dictatorship or tyranny. He places emphasis on the availability of opportunities for the people to control their leaders and to them without recourse to a revolution. Arnold (2019) stated that democracy means the idea that the individual is born free and has to consent to the

necessary restrictions in favour of the common interest, which basically results from the equality of all the members of society, of the people as a whole. This consent is expressed by a law that is made by the people, regularly, by its representatives in the parliament or in some systems, by the people's direct vote. Democracy in the simplest and most common way it is expressed as the power of the people to choose the government only. Democracy is evident for its effectiveness for good governance, effective control and monitoring, preservation of human rights, accountability, safety and peace (Kiyani, 2013). Diamond (2004) gave an overview of his opinion of democracy thus:

- i. A system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections.
- ii. Active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life.
- iii. Protection of the human rights of all citizens.
- iv. A rule of law in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens.

There are many variants of democracy today. The most dominant variable is what he terms the direct democracy in which all citizens of a country are given direct and active participation in the decision making process of their countries. Another variant is the representative democracy in which the whole body of all eligible citizens remains the sovereign power but political power is exercised indirectly through elected representatives (Nwogu, 2015). Either direct or representative democracy, it is to be pointed out that democracy emphasised the participation and involvement of the people in decision to elect and remove its government. It is the practice that involves elections and voting unanimously without coercion or inducement against their will.

An Overview of Election

It has been noted that democracy cannot survive in any political community without elections. Elections are the life blood of a functional democracy. Waldemar (2013) stated that elections are a procedure typical for democratic systems, but also systems which do not respect the principles of democracy often employ them. Anglin (1998), cited in Mesfin (2008) opined that the founding pillars of any democratic political system, whether considered fragile or established, remain undoubtedly elections which can simply be taken as the most critical and visible means through which all citizens can peacefully choose or remove their leaders. Elections are the principal instruments that compel or encourage the policy-makers to pay attention to citizens (Powell, 2000). The importance of Elections has been emphasised as the fundamental structure for a democratic existence. Highlighting this essence, Sisk (2017) pointed out that first, elections are not just elections: they are part of a process. Second, elections determine leadership and either continuity or change in this leadership. Third, even flawed elections may have value in institutionalising electoral integrity, provided that subsequent electoral cycles reinforce key democratic or electoral principles Elections functions to enforce political accountability against persons holding public office.

It consists in the expression of disapproval for their political activity and the consequences expressed through the cyclical nature of the elections, as a result of which the previously granted power of attorney may be executed if voters are satisfied with the

policies or revoked, as a sanction for failure to meet the expectations placed upon the government (Antoszewski, 2004, cited in Waldemar, 2013). Elections play various roles in a democracy; the efficiency of the process to ensure capable leaders and representation at every level of government depends on the citizens understanding of its importance as a weapon of political control and accountability. Elections fare better when it competitive as it determine the democratic legitimisation of the exercise of public authority (Waldemar, 2013).

Understanding Vote Buying

Election is one of the core characteristics of democracy; it provides the opportunity for the qualified citizens to vote and be voted for into the seats of power and authority to manage state affairs and resources. Voting is a political right constitutionally granted to adult citizens in any democratic political community. It is an instrument used to induce changes or bring alternative government. Thus, election is the backbone of democracy; it forms the major pillar that supports and stabilised every democratic institution.

Overtime, there have been observations that in most developing countries, there is a lack of political education towards understanding the potency of voting, the failure of the citizens to recognise the importance of elections, create a lackadaisical mindset and attitudes towards voting. When there is a lackluster attitude to voting, political parties and their agents, create an atmosphere of money politics by buying votes either through direct payment of money to voters on election day, or distributions of cheap worthless material clothing or staple foods to poor uneducated rural citizens in exchanged for their permanent voter cards (PVCs) before election day as in the case of Nigeria. The concept of vote buying therefore denotes the economic persuasions of voters to sway their political interest in exchange for instant financial or material gratifications by political parties and their agents.

Dekel, Jackson & Wolinsky (2004) found that vote buying appears in many societies in different forms, which includes among others direct payments to a voter. Vote buying has been widespread in many countries that have continued along the path towards democracy (Baidoo, Dankwa & Eshun (2018). Schaffer & Schedler (2005) conceived vote buying in its literal sense, is a simple economic exchange. Candidates “buy” and citizens “sell” votes, as they buy and sell apples, shoes or television sets. Vote buying is any form of financial, material or promissory inducement or reward by a candidate, political party, agent or supporter to influence a voter to cast his or her vote or even abstain from doing so in order to enhance the chances of a particular contestant to win an election (Olalekan, 2019). Vote buying can be conceived as a conscious activity of political parties and their agents to turn the tide of elections to their favour. This is done through material and financial gratifications and their targets go beyond rural poor to enlightened electorates across all political zones in the state.

Understanding Political Violence

The human history has a strong connection with aggression and violence. Men take to violence and aggression to secure things that they did not possess or to preserve things that they possessed. In ancient times, political violence had caused disorder in the state and in

modern times, the problem of political violence has become more complicated taking different angles. It is not uncommon that in a State, political violence exists due to divergent interests. Political violence involves a heterogeneous repertoire of actions oriented at inflicting physical, psychological, and symbolic damage to individuals and/or property with the intention of influencing various audiences for affecting or resisting political, social, and/or cultural change. The concept of political violence involves a clash where often force is used by one or more groups to a political end (Lorenzo, 2015).

Anifowose (1982), cited in Johnkennedy & Ejue (2015) stressed that political violence is the use of or threat of physical act carried out by individual or individuals within a political system against another individual or groups and property, with the intent to cause injury or death to persons, damage or destruction to property and whose objective, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstance, implementation and effects have political significances, that tends to modify or change the behaviour of others in the existing arrangement for the political system. In developing countries with nascent democracy, Political violence could take two dimensions that are pre-electoral violence and post-electoral violence (Tamuno, 1991, cited in Johnkennedy & Ejue, 2015).

The pre-electoral violence may occur where electoral laws or provisions are seen to favor a particular candidate at the expense of the other. It could also occur when a particular candidate is over-ambitious and perhaps sees the signals that he may likely lose the election to the opponent. Post-electoral violence on the other hand, may be spontaneous. It may be engineered by individuals who feel cheated, alienated or deprived by the unfairness of the electoral process. This deprivation may be real or perceived. In Nigeria, the purpose of such violence apart from seeking redress through illegal means is also to destroy it, if we cannot have it (Afolabi, 2007). The effect of political violence is all encompassing. In nascent democracies of developing countries, majority of the citizens stays away from politics as it is perceived to be 'bloody and a dirty game.' Eligible voters avoid voting due to outbreak of violence which often leads to unnecessary loss of lives and properties. In most cases, those who turn out to participate in elections are compelled to cast their vote for a candidates or political parties that do not align with their interest.

Empirical Studies

Ovwasa (2014) investigated money politics and vote buying in Nigeria. The researcher made use of secondary sources of data and content analysis was employed to analyse the data. The findings showed that money politics and vote buying have taken the centre stage of Nigeria political activities because parties and candidates have shown by their conduct during political campaigns, that good party manifestoes and integrity of candidates jostling for public offices are no longer sufficient to guarantee electoral success. The researcher concluded that money politics and vote buying are potent dangers to the democratic process of electing officers and in turn prevents good governance.

Aliu, Lawal & Adamu (2015) studied the ugly phenomenon of money politics in Nigeria's democracy and its implication for sustainable development. The findings revealed that until Nigerians move from politics of money and adopt politics of ideology and creativity, advancement of the country's democracy might be a mirage. Baidoo,

Dankwa & Eshun (2018) examined the culture of vote buying and its implications in Nigeria using primary data sourced via questionnaire and interview in a sampled population of 300 respondents and both quantitative and qualitative methods were used for data analysis. The data revealed that items used as vote buying incentives ranged from party branded items, silver pans (basins), cloths, gas cylinders laptops, food, money, cutlasses, outboard motors and wellington boots. It was concluded that vote buying has negative impacts on Nigeria democracy such as creating undue advantage over ambitious for politicians to win elections.

Babayo & Mohammed (2018) explored the causes and manifestations of money politics in Nigeria and also to examine the impact of money politics on general elections in Nigeria during the Fourth Republic (1999-2015). The researchers made use of qualitative method of data collection and analysis. It was discovered that there was heavy use of money during general elections and the outcome was affected by such brazen act given undue advantage to politicians who have the means to buy their way into power. Babatunde, Shaibu & Ariyo (2019) examined the implications of money politics in Nigeria's fourth republic for electoral process and democratic consolidation using classical elite and rational choice institutionalism theoretical frame. Data were generated from secondary sources and content analytical method was adopted. It found that in spite of the importance of money as an indispensable socio-economic tool in party politics and election campaign, the high influence of money in politics has seriously discredited electoral process in Nigeria since 1999.

Babatunde, Iwu & Osuji (2019) examined the implications of money politics and vote buying in Nigeria's fourth republic for national security. The researchers employed secondary data and content analytical method. It revealed that money-politics and vote buying are the major factors that stimulate bad governance, controversies, social conflicts, ethno-religious crises, violence, militancy, separatist agitations, insurgency and all forms of threats to human lives, property and national security. Olalekan (2019) studied vote buying: examining the manifestations, motivations, and effects of an emerging dimension of election rigging in Nigeria using secondary data and content analysis. The study showed that the motivation of vote buying as being the desperation of politicians to win elections at all costs tops the list of motivating factors in vote buying. Similarly, Agyepong, Eshun & Baidoo (2021) employed a mixed method approach to study voters' knowledge of the laws on vote buying and its implications for Ghana's Democracy. Their findings showed that vote-buying can be a greater motivation to the poor to vote than the enticement of public goods, as the poor are oftentimes forgotten about in the distribution of public goods.

It can be stated unequivocally that the issue of vote buying is not new in academic context; but the extant literature has not dwelt much on the consequences of vote buying on Nigerian democracy. Besides, to the knowledge of the current paper, only few studies; Baidoo, Dankwa & Eshun (2018); Agyepong, Eshun & Baidoo (2021) employed quantitative methods. What makes this paper distinct is that it does not only look at the causes of vote buying, rather it focused on its implications on Nigerian democracy particularly; examining the impacts of vote buying on political violence, dividends of democracy and partisan loyalty using quantitative method. More so, it examined Ogwa in

Esan West Local Government Area of Edo State, where such work has not been carried out.

Theoretical Framework

In choosing a suitable theoretical framework for this analysis, social exchange theory was adopted. Karen & Eric (2006) stated that social exchange theory is one of the major theoretical perspectives in the field of social psychology since the early writings of Homans (1958), Blau (1964) and Emerson (1962, 1972). The dominant emphasis of the theory is the behaviour of actors in interaction with one another. The primary aim of the theory was to explain fundamental processes of social behaviour (power, conformity, status, leadership and justice). Social exchange is defined as the exchange of activity, tangible or intangible, and more or less rewarding or costly, between at least two persons. Cost was viewed primarily in terms of alternative activities or opportunities foregone by the actors involved. Homans explained social exchange theory by showing how A's behaviour reinforced B's behaviour (in a two party relation between actors A and B), and how B's behavior reinforced A's behavior in return Homans (1958, cited in Karen & Eric, 2006). This theory suits this study because the practice of vote buying involves social interactions in a political community or society. In Nigeria, vote buying has become almost an unspoken tradition, in spite of Electoral Laws made to curb such activates, as it worsen over the years. The behaviour of the political actors (parties and their agents) has continued to reinforce most politically uneducated voters' behaviour to normalise vote buying. We must state clearly here that, if the political actors have not continued to provide money and material to buy vote, the electorate will obviously not be interested but instead demand for good policies and governance.

Methods

The researchers utilised descriptive survey design. The instrument used for data collection was questionnaire. It was a close-ended questionnaire, structured into Likert format having a maximum of 5point scale ranged in ascending order: SA = Strongly Agree (5points), A = Agree (4points), UD – Undecided (3points), D = Disagree (2pints) and SD = Strongly Disagree (1point). The population of the study is 5,628 eligible registered voters in Ogwa, Esan West Local Government Area of Edo State (Information Booklet, Edo State Governorship Election, 2020). The sample size is 375. This was determined by Taro Yamane formula. Simple random technique was used to select 375 voters who participated in this study. Simple random sampling was used because the researchers want to give all members of the population equal opportunity of been represented in this study. Face and content validity was employed to authenticate the effectiveness of the research instrument, while the reliability was determined at 0.58 coefficient using Parson Movement Correlation. However, 300 copies of questionnaire were completely filed and returned successfully. The data were analysed quantitatively with SPSS using simple percentage and liner regression

Presentation and Analysis of Data

Table 1: Vote Buying and Political Violence

Statement	SA	%	A	%	UD	%	D	%	SD	%
Vote buying makes candidate that lost in election feel cheated with votes	96	32	84	28	10	3.3	60	20	50	18.7
Vote buying makes candidate that lost in election unsatisfied with election results	110	36.7	84	28	16	5.3	50	18.7	40	13.3
Vote buying makes candidate that lost in election feel humiliated	86	28.7	100	33.3	14	4.7	57	19	43	14.3
Vote buying create undue ambition on candidates to win elections	94	31.3	116	38.7	10	3.3	50	18.7	30	10
Vote buying gives undue advantage to wrong candidates to win elections	110	36.7	80	26.7	10	3.3	58	19.3	42	14
Candidate who felt cheated in elections may seek redress illegally by destructing the electoral process	120	40	86	28.7	04	1.3	56	18.7	34	11.3

Table 1 revealed the effects of vote buying on political violence in Nigeria. It was found that approximately 60%, 64.7%, 60%%, 70%, 63.4% and 68.7% of the respondents indicated that vote buying leads to political violence by making the candidate that lost election feel cheated, unsatisfactory, humiliation and provide undue ambitions and advantages for wrong candidates to win elections as well as means of destructing electoral process.

Table 2: Vote Buying and Dividends of Democracy in Nigeria

Statement	SA	%	A	%	UD	%	D	%	SD	%
Vote buying makes people in your community not to be adequately empowered by the governments.	100	33.3	90	30	10	3.3	60	20	40	13.3
Vote buying can make political representatives not to provide social amenities in your community.	120	40	90	30	10	3.3	53	17.7	27	09

Vote buying makes political leaders to undermine the civil rights of the citizens.	90	30	100	33.3	14	4.7	56	18.7	50	18.7
Vote buying has led to low standard of living in your community.	100	33.3	116	38.7	10	3.3	40	13.3	34	11.3
Vote buying makes politicians to be more concern about election rather than security of lives in your community.	110	36.7	86	28.7	10	3.3	50	18.7	44	14.7
Vote buying makes governments not to care about unemployment situation in your community	130	43.3	66	22	04	1.3	56	18.7	44	14.7

Table 2 showed the effects of vote buying on dividends of democracy in Nigeria. It implied that approximately 63.3%, 70%, 63.3%, 72%, 66.5% and 65.3% of respondents indicated that vote buying has negative effects on citizens' empowerment, social amenities, civil rights of the citizens, standard of living, security of lives and employment rate in Nigeria.

Table 3: Vote Buying and Partisan Loyalty in Nigeria

Statement	SA	%	A	%	UD	%	D	%	SD	%
If any political party gives you money, any material or promise to vote, you will vote for the party.	110	36.7	90	30	10	3.3	50	16.7	40	13.3
If there is more than one political party that give you money to vote, you will vote for the one that gave you more money.	120	40	70	23.3	10	3.3	43	14.3	47	15.7
You do not vote for any political party except they give you money, material or promise.	100	33.3	110	36.7	10	3.3	46	15.3	24	0.8
You vote for political party of your choice not because of money, material or promise.	30	10	50	15.7	10	3.3	102	34	108	36
You can decide not to vote for political party that gave you money and nothing will happen.	55	18.3	45	15	10	3.3	100	33.3	90	30
Party leaders and their agents compel you to vote in favour of their party when you accept money or materials from their party.	120	40	80	26.7	14	4.7	56	18.7	30	10

Table 3 depicted the effects of vote buying on partisan loyalty in Nigeria. It showed that approximately 66.7%, 63.3%, 70%, 25.7%, 33.3% and 66.7% affirmed that vote buying creates voters partisan loyalty because of money or any material collected from political parties, compromised their choice of candidate to vote, vote based on fear of harm, and vote by threat of party leaders and agents.

Test of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1

H₀₁: There is no significant relationship between vote buying and political violence in Nigerian democracy.

Table 4 Summary of results of tested hypothesis I

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics					
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change	Durbin-Watson
1	.964 ^a	.929	.923	52.04427	.929	169.662	1	13	.000	1.538

a. Predictors: (Constant), VOTE BUYING

B. Dependent Variable: ELECTORAL VIOLENCE

Table 4 indicates that R Square vale is .929 (92.9%). This shows that independent variable (vote buying) is able explain 92.9% variation in the dependent variable (electoral violence). The remaining unexplained 7.1% is due to error term. Thus, there is a strong positive relationship between vote buying and electoral violence in Nigerian democracy. The Adjusted R Square of.923 (92.3%) shows that vote buying will bring about92.3%changes in electoral violence in Nigerian democracy. The calculated F Change value is 169.66 at 5% level of significance and a degree of freedom of df₁=1 and df₂ =13 while the critical value is 4.67. Since the calculated value of F Change is greater than the critical table value (169.66> 4.67), it means that vote buying is significant to electoral violence. The Durbin-Watson value is 1.5 which is approximately 2, Based on the rule of thumb; there is no auto correlation among the successive variables. This implies that the result is acceptable for policy making.

Hypothesis 2

H₀₂: There is no significant relationship between vote buying and dividends of democracy in Nigerian.

Table 5: Summary of Result of tested Hypothesis 2

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics					
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change	Durbin-Watson
1	.891 ^a	.795	.778	18.15877	.795	46.443	1	12	.000	2.000

a. Predictors: (Constant), VOTE BUYING
B. Dependent Variable: DIVIDENDS

Table 5 indicates that R Square vale is .795(79.5%). This means that the independent variable (vote buying) is able explain 79.5% variation in the dependent variable (dividends of democracy). The unexplained variation of 20.5% is due to error term. Thus, there is a strong positive relationship between vote buying and dividends of democracy in Nigeria. The adjusted R Square of.778 (77.8%) shows that vote buying will bring about 77.8% changes in dividends of democracy in Nigeria. The calculated F Change value is 46.443at 5% level of significance and a degree of freedom of $df_1=1$ and $df_2 =12$ while the critical value is 4.75. Since the calculated value of F Change is greater than the critical table value ($46.443 > 4.75$), it means that vote buying is significant to dividends of democracy. The Durbin-Watson value is 2.000 which is approximately 2, Based on the rule of thumb; it implies that there is no auto correlation. This means that the result is acceptable for policy making.

Hypothesis 3

H₀₃: There is no significant relationship between vote buying and partisan loyalty in Nigerian democracy.

Table 6: Summary of Result of tested Hypothesis 3
Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Square Change	Change Statistics			Durbin-Watson	
						F Change	df1	df2		
1	.966 ^a	.933	.928	58.32191	.933	181.267	1	13	.000	2.443

a. Predictors: (Constant), VOTE BUYING
B. Dependent Variable: PARTISAN LOYALTY

Table 6 shows that R Square vale is .933 (93.3%). This means that the independent variable (vote buying) is able explain 93.3% variation in the dependent variable (partisan loyalty). The unexplained variation of 6.7% is due to error term. Thus, there is a strong positive relationship between vote buying and partisan loyalty in Nigerian democracy. The adjusted R Square of.928 (92.8%) shows that vote buying will lead to 92.8% change in partisan loyalty in Nigerian democracy. The calculated F Change value is 181.267at 5% level of significance and a degree of freedom of $df_1=1$ and $df_2 =13$ while the critical value is 4.67. Since the calculated value of F Change is greater than the critical table value ($181.267 > 4.67$), it means that vote buying is significant to partisan loyalty in Nigerian democracy. The Durbin-Watson value is 2.443 which is approximately 2, Based on the rule of thumb; there is no first order serial correlation. This means that the result is acceptable for policy making.

Discussion of Findings

The results of hypothesis one indicates a significant relationship between vote buying and electoral violence in Nigerian democracy. It was also observed from the respondents that vote buying makes candidate that lost election feel cheated, humiliated, unsatisfied with election results, create undue ambitions and advantage for wrong candidates to win elections, as well as seeking for illegal means of redress that destruct electoral process. This finding corroborates that of Olalekan (2019) who stated that vote buying leads to desperation of politicians to win elections at all costs because of the money they invested in buying votes.

The results of hypothesis two show that there exists a significant relationship between vote buying and dividends of democracy in Nigeria. The respondents revealed that vote buying makes political representatives to show little or no interest in the provision of dividends of democracy because they have to recoup the money invested to win elections. This finding also agrees with Olalekan (2019) who submitted that politicians operate on the business and investment model, investing their capital in “paying” the voters so that they can recoup their investments. It is also in line with Homans’ (1958) perception on social exchange theory which assumed that cost is viewed primarily in terms of alternative activities or opportunities foregone by the actors involved in exchange. Thus, the opportunity cost of winning an election, is the amount of money or material incentives a politician gave to electorates to vote for him. The politician placed vote as a priority over money he gave to voters, while the electorates see money as priority over public goods or dividends of democracy to be delivered by the politician. The finding is also in line with Agyepong, Eshun & Baidoo (2021) who found that vote-buying can be a greater motivation to the poor to vote than the enticement of public goods, as the poor are oftentimes forgotten about in the distribution of public goods. The result of hypothesis three indicates that there is a significant relationship between vote buying and partisan loyalty in Nigerian democracy. The respondents stated that voters are either willingly or compel to vote for political party that gave them money or incentives even if the candidate is not their choice, which makes wrong candidate to win election at the detriments of Nigerian democracy.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The researchers examined vote buying and its implications in Nigerian democracy. The researchers conclude that vote buying has significant relationship with electoral violence, dividends of democracy and partisan loyalty in Nigeria. Based on the findings and conclusion, the following recommendations are hereby given:

1. Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) should carry out a crushing enlightenment campaign across the nook and cranny of the country to educate the politicians and voters about the evils and ills of vote buying and selling on democracy in Nigeria. This should be done before and during elections using radio, television, social media, newspaper and magazine to channel the message to the people.

2. Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) should monitor the fund raising and spending of political parties before and during campaign and elections. Through this avenue INEC can regulate revenue and expenditure of political parties to stop the flamboyant spending of political parties during elections.
3. INC through electoral tribunal should prosecute and bring to book any political party, agent or voter involved in the act of vote buying or selling.
4. Government should ensure effective enforcement of electoral laws to deter vote buying and selling in Nigeria. To make it work, INEC through Inspector General of police should train a special squad to monitor electoral processes in Nigeria such political parties' primary elections, campaigns and voting. The squad should be equipped and adequately remunerated to make them function effectively.
5. Government should reduce the poverty rate in Nigeria. It was highlighted in literature that vote selling is higher among the poor population in Nigeria. The problem of poverty among the citizens in Nigeria can be solved if governments at all level are sincerely committed to their responsibilities, especially in the areas of job creation and provision of social amenities.

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